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Bioprospecting And The Convention On Biological Diversity
Andrew W. Torrance
Introduction
Of the estimated 250,000 known plant species in the world today, perhaps
5,000 have been screened for their medicinal potential. Yet, any one species
could be the cure for a disease that is considered incurable. Consumers in
the United States spend more than $6 billion annually on medicines derived
from tropical plants. That lucrative market is the incentive pharmaceutical
companies need to scour the rich rain forests of the tropics for the virtually
limitless supply of active compounds, some of which could contain compounds
for the next miracle drug.
- Conservation International1
Tremendous diversity characterizes life on earth.2 Current best estimates
range upwards of 100 million extant species.3 Since the rst unicellular organ-
ism arose more than one billion years ago, countless lineages of life have evolved
along their own unique adaptive trajectories in response to environmental chal-
lenges and opportunities.4 The result has been a bewildering variety of organ-
isms that incorporate within themselves myriad biochemical and genetic solu-
1See http://www.conservation.org/WEB/FIELDACT/C-C PROG/ECON/biopros.htm. This,
and all websites listed below, visited March 25, 2000.
2See generally Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life (1992).
3See Edward O. Wilson and Dan L. Perlman, Conserving Earth's Biodiversity CD-ROM
(1999).
4See id.
1tions to the challenges of survival and successful reproduction. Bioprospecting
exploits these natural solutions to biological problems by attempting to harnass
their potential for solving problems of interest and necessity to humans.
Bioprospecting is the exploration of biodiversity for commercially valuable ge-
netic and biochemical resources.5 Such resources can take many forms and have
already been discovered within the extracts, cells, or genomes6 of many organ-
isms. They range from genes7 to the biochemicals for which genes code8 to the
virtually limitless array of organic chemicals produced in chemical reactions, or
cascades of multiple chemical reactions, mediated by polypeptides9 or polynu-
cleotides10. These derivatives of biodiversity have already played a large role
in the development of many economically useful products.11 A representative
sample of the fruits of bioprospecting follow.
Probably the most oft-quoted bioprospecting success involves the rosy periwin-
5See Walter V. Reid et al., A New Lease on Life, in Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Genetic
Resources for Sustainable Development (Eds. Walter V. Reid et al. Eds.) 1 (1993).
6A genome is All the genetic material in the chromosomes of a particular organism; its size
is generally given as its total number of base pairs. See Life Science Dictionary, Biotech Re-
sources and Indiana University http://biotech.icmb.utexas.edu/search/dict-search.html
(2000).
7A gene is The fundamental physical and functional unit of heredity. A gene
is an ordered sequence of nucleotides located in a particular position on a particu-
lar chromosome that encodes a specic functional product (i.e., a protein or RNA
molecule). See Life Science Dictionary, Biotech Resources and Indiana University
http://biotech.icmb.utexas.edu/search/dict-search.html (2000).
8Genes code for polypeptides and polynucleotides (either DNA or RNA). See Benjamin
Lewin, Genes VII 29 (2000).
9A polypeptide (or protein) is A chain of peptides, or amino acids, usually less than 100
amino acids long. A polypeptide is formed during the process of translation. One or more
polypeptides are required to make a protein. See Life Science Dictionary, Biotech Resources
and Indiana University http://biotech.icmb.utexas.edu/search/dict-search.html (2000).
10A polynucleotide (i.e., DNA or RNA) is A covalently-linked sequence of nu-
cleotides in which the 3' and 5' ends on each nucleotide are joined by phosphodi-
ester bonds. See Life Science Dictionary, Biotech Resources and Indiana University
http://biotech.icmb.utexas.edu/search/dict-search.html (2000)
11Derivatives of biodiversity have signicantly contributed to the development drugs, botan-
ical medicines, agricultural produce, ornamental horticulture, crop protection, cosmetics, and
non-medical industrial processes.
2kle (Catharanthus roseus) of the island of Madagascar. Biologist Edward O.
Wilson provides a lyrical account in his book The Diversity of Life:
An inconspicuous plant with a pink ve-petaled ower, it produces two alka-
loids, vinblastine and vincristine, that cure most victims of two the deadliest of
concers, Hodgkin's disease, mostly aicting young adults, and acute lymphoyc-
tic leukemia, which used to be a virtual death sentence for children.12
Vinblastine and vincristine have also been found eective in treating Wilms'
tumor, primary brain tumors, and testicular, cervical, and breast cancers.13
Introduced in the 1960s by the Eli Lilly Company14, these drugs derived from
the rosy periwinkle have earned that company roughly $200 million in annual
revenue.15
The neem tree (Azirdirachta indica), native to India and other parts of trop-
ical Asia, and a near taxonomic relative of mahogany, has yielded a cornucopia
of useful natural products. Neem extracts have been employed by Indian folk
medicine against numerous ailments, including fevers and infections.16 Indian
researchers have isolated three substances from neem oil that are highly e-
cacious as contraceptives: DK-1 is a potent vaginal spermicide with the added
benet of being a powerful germicide; DNM-5 can be administered orally to pre-
vent egg implantation early in pregnancy; and DNM-7 is an abortifacient.17 By
1995, the United States Patent and Trademark Oce had already granted more
than 50 patents on chemicals derived from the neem tree.18 Much controversy
12See Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life 283 (1992).
13See id. 381.
14See http://www.lilly.com/about/overview/milestones.html (2000).
15See Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life 283 (1992).
16See David Dickson and K.S. Jayaraman, Aid groups back challenge to neem patents, 377
Nature 95 (1995).
17See K.S. Jayaraman, Neem unsheaths contraceptive potential, 377 Nature 95 (1995).
18See David Dickson and K.S. Jayaraman, Aid groups back challenge to neem patents, 377
3has surrounded an insecticide, whose active ingredient is azadirachtin, a chemi-
cal extracted from neem tree seeds. W.R. Grace & Company19 received a U.S.
patent on a method of extracting azadirachtin and stabilizing it in solution.20
A coalition of international aid and environmental nongovernmental groups, in-
cluding Jeremy Rifkin and the Foundation for Economic Trends, challenged the
patent on grounds that traditional Indian folk use of neem extracts to control
insects consituted prior art.21 A similar challenge was mounted to invalidate
a patent granted by the European Patent Oce jointly to Grace and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture for a neem-based fungicide.22 Such was the value of
this single species of tree that the market value of neem seeds reached $300 per
tonne in 1995.23
The polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is one of the most important techniques
in modern molecular biology and biochemistry and has been fundamental to
the owering of the entire biotechnology industry.24 The PCR allows the iden-
tication and manipulation of extremely minute samples of DNA by amplifying
as little as a single molecule of DNA into virtually unlimited quantities.25 The
technique was conceived by Kary Mullis, then a researcher at Cetus Corporation,
who was subsequently awarded a Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1993 for his dis-
Nature 95 (1995).
19See corporate homepage at http://www.grace.com.
20See David Dickson and K.S. Jayaraman, Aid groups back challenge to neem patents, 377
Nature 95 (1995).
21See id.
22See id.
23See id.
24Kary Mullis received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1993 for his conception of the
PCR barely a decade previous. See http://nobelprizes.com/nobel/chemistry/1993a.html
(2000).
25See http://nobelprizes.com/nobel/chemistry/1993a.html (2000).
4covery.26 Mullis developed the PCR by employing a heat-tolerant enzyme called
Taq polymerase, which is produced by a thermophilic27 eubacterium (Thermus
acquaticus) endemic to the hotsprings of Yellowstone National Park.28 Cetus
obtained a U.S. patent for the PCR process and then sold the rights to the
process to Homan-LaRoche Ltd.29 for more than $300 million.30 Each year
patents on the use of Taq polymerase in the PCR earn their owners more than
$200 million.31
Hoping to replicate the success of Taq polymerase, biotechnology companies
have begun searching for the next Thermus acquaticus. As Science reported in
1997:
Prospectors are lining up to exploit the famous hot springs of Yellowstone
National Park - not for minerals, but for the rugged microbes they contain,
called thermophiles. U.S. National Park Service ocials signed a pioneering
contract that formally opened the hot springs to bioentrepreneurs on 17 August,
as military bands, rangers on horseback, and Vice President Al Gore celebrated
Yellowstone's 125th anniversary.
The initial agreement gives San Diego-based Diversa Corp. the right to
commercialize thermophiles collected in the park in exchange for $175,000 over
5 years, plus a share of any prots. Park superintendent Michael Finley says
deals like this will bring nancial dividends and increase knowledge of the park's
tiniest inhabitants. One good way to protect something, adds Diversa molecular
biologist Eric Mathur, is to show it has value.32
It was such optimistic sentiments, along with the accelerating rate at which
biodiversity was been destroyed by human activities33, that inspired the United
26See id.
27Thermophilic refers to organisms that inhabit high temperatures habitats.
28See generally T.D. Brock and H. Freeze, Thermus aquaticus gen. n., a nonsporulating
extreme thermophile, J. Bacteriol. 98:289-297 (1969). See also Michael Gross, Life on the
Edge: Amazing Creatures Thriving in Extreme Environments 103-104 (1998).
29See corporate homepage at http://www.roche.com (2000).
30See J. St. George, Status Report: Taq Patent Dispute, 275 Science 1348 (1997).
31See id.
32See Eliot Marshall, Yellowstone Opens the Gates to Biotech, 227 Science 1027 (1997).
33See Edward O. Wilson and Dan L. Perlman, Conserving Earth's Biodiversity CD-ROM
(1999).
5Nations to sponser the Convention on Biological Diversity34 (CBD) at the 1992
Rio Conference35 and that motivated an overwhelming majority of the countries
in the world to sign and ratify it36.
If biodiversity represents a potentially valuable source of raw material for
the biotechnology industry, its geographic distribution places the lion's share of
this natural resource within the borders of poorer equatorial countries.37 The
CBD includes among its goals the conservation of biodiversity and the equi-
table sharing of the wealth generated therefrom between those countries rich in
biotechnology and those rich in biodiversity.38 Implementation of the CBD has
led many source countries to attempt to restict legal access to their biodiversity
in order to prevent commercial bioprospectors from freely exploiting those re-
sources.39 Such legal hurdles have added considerably to the transaction costs
of bioprospecting. The sharing of prots from successful commercial products
derived from biodiversity is often the sine qua non of such access agreements.40
34See U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 2, 1992, U.N. Doc. DPI/130/7 (1992).
35Ocially known as the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment.
36A total of 176 countries and the European Union (EU) have formally ratied the CBD.
See http://www.biodiv.org/conv/pdf/ratification-date.pdf (2000). By comparison, the
United Nations has 188 member states and two non-member states with permanent observer
missions. See http://www.un.org/Overview/missions.htm#nperm (2000).
37See Edward O. Wilson and Dan L. Perlman, Conserving Earth's Biodiversity CD-ROM
(1999).
38The text of CBD Article 1 states that The objectives of this Convention, to be pur-
sued in accordance with the relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological diver-
sity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the ben-
ets arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access
to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into ac-
count all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding. See
http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art1.htm (2000).
39See, e.g., Ra ul O. Castillo, The Andean Common Code for the Access to Genetic Re-
sources: A General Overview, in Global Genetic Resources: Access, Owneship, and Intellec-
tual Property Rights (Eds. K. Elaine Hoagland and Amy Y. Rossman) (1997).
40See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, Yellowstone Opens the Gates to Biotech, 227 Science 1027
(1997).
6Furthermore, much debate has surrounded proposals to extend the ownership of
intellectual property rights in inventions derived from biodiversity to the coun-
tries of geographic origin.41 In short, the CBD has greatly altered the legal
landscape in which commercial bioprospecting takes place.
This paper attempts to assess the economic value of biodiversity to commercial
bioprospectors and source countries, surveys the provisions of the CBD that deal
directly with bioprospecting, examines the types of legal access regimes being
established by source countries, and considers the eects that new technologies
like genomics and combinatorial chemistry will have on the future importance
of bioprospecting.
Economics of Bioprospecting
Despite a wealth of anecdotal evidence, the economic value of bioprospecting
has been dicult to estimate reliably. However, the issue has received renewed
attention since the advent of the CBD due to the potential importance the re-
sulting valuation might have as an incentive to conserve global biodiversity. A
variety of methods have been employed to develop estimates of the economic
use value42 of biodiversity. Each has advantages and disadvantages. The range
41See, e.g., Henry L. Shands and Amy Y. Rossland, Perspectives on Global Genetic Re-
sources: Access, Ownership, and Intellectual Property Rights in Global Genetic Resources:
Access, Owneship, and Intellectual Property Rights (Eds. K. Elaine Hoagland and Amy Y.
Rossman) (1997).
42Use value here refers to the commercially useful natural products and genetic resources
biodiversity can provide. Another use value not of direct relevance to this paper, but of po-
tentially large magnitude, is the value of ecosystem services provided by biodiversity. See
generally NATURE'S SERVICES (ED. GRETCHEN DAILY) (1997). Other values of bio-
7of values estimated in dierent analyses spans multiple orders of magnitude.
One approach is to estimate the economic value of bioprospecting from rst
principles. At the very least, this can provide reference value to evaluate esti-
mates derived by other methods. Such an analysis is necessarily very rough and
has large margins or error. What follow are the steps of calculation and the
explicit assumptions of those calculations:
1.
Assume that the number of distinct species of extant organisms is roughly
10 million. Current best estimates range as high as 100 million species43, so this
is a conservative gure.
2.
Assume that the mean number of distinct genes in a species' genome is
10 000. Current best estimates suggest that the number of genes per genome
ranges from a minimum of 500 for mycoplasma to a maximum of 100 000 for
mammals.44 Plants (50 000 genes)45 and insects (12 000 genes)46 comprise the
vast majority of species47, so an estimate of 10 000 genes per genome is also a
conservative gure.48
diversity recognized by economics include its option value (that is, other uses that might be
made of biodiversity in the future whose potential is preserved as long as biodiversity is not
liquidated) and existence value (that is, the value people derive from knowing that biodiversity
is still extant). See generally TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCE ECONOMICS (5th. Edition 2000).
43See Edward O. Wilson and Dan L. Perlman, Conserving Earth's Biodiversity CD-ROM
(1999).
44See Benjamin Lewin, Genes VII 33 (2000).
45See id.
46See id.
47See Edward O. Wilson and Dan L. Perlman, Conserving Earth's Biodiversity CD-ROM
(1999).
48Additional evidence suggests that this gure may signicantly underestimate the mean
genome size. When Celera Corporation determined the full genome sequence of the fruit y
(Drosophila melanogaster), initial analysis suggested that the y's genome included almost 2
000 more genes than the 12 000 originally estimated. See Mark D. Adams et al., The Genome
Sequence of Drosophila melanogaster, 287 Science 2185 (2000).
83.
Assume that only one gene out of every 100 000 genes could lead to a prof-
itable49 invention not duplicable by other genes. Given that the current rate
at which genes have yielded protable inventions is orders of magnitude greater
than that assumed here50, this gure is also conservative. This assumption
likely holds even if one accounts for the costs of searching for protable genes
and developing their commercial potential.
4.
Therefore, the number of protable genes represented by the earth's extant
biodiversity is (107)x(104)x(10 5) = 1 million protable genes. Note that un-
der less conservative assumptions the total number of non-redundant protable
genes would be much greater.
5.
If the annual average protability of a protable gene were $1 million, then
the prots generated by protable genes would generate $1 trillion per year. By
comparison, if the annual average protability were $10 million per protable
gene, then the total gure would rise to $10 trillion; with average protability
of $100 million, the total would rise to an extraordinary $100 trillion.
If any of the above assumptions are too conservative - a signicant likelihood
- then the prots available from genes could be even greater. It is notable that
this rough calculation estimated only the prots from genes and completely
discounted the value of natural products like those from the rosy periwinkle51
49Protable here refers to a product having a present discounted value of greater than zero
monetary units.
50Far fewer than 100 000 genes have ever been assayed, yet there are already many more
than 10 protable products derived from genes (e.g., alpha-interferon, erythropoietin).
51See supra note 11.
9and the neem tree52. Given the deliberate use of conservative estimates in the
calculation, it is reasonable to treat $1 trillion as a meaningful reference value.
An estimate of such large magnitude indicates just how great might be the
potential economic use value of biodiversity for bioprospecting.
A number of more sophisticated formal analyses have attempted to evaluate
the economic worth of biodiversity for use in drug development. Some have con-
cluded that the value of biodiversity is rather small53 while others have suggested
that its worth as a source for novel pharmaceuticals is potentially signicant54.
The latter have argued that the economic value of genes and natural products
derived from biodiversity could provide a powerful incentive to conserve areas
that are especially biodiverse.55 It has also been suggested that bioprospecting
could aord poorer countries a unique opportunity to develop their economies
by spurring the development of domestic biotechnology industries.56
It is necessary to assess which of these claims is more accurate in order to deter-
mine whether bioprospecting is viable as a means for implementing the CBD.
52See supra note 15.
53See generally R. David. Simpson, Roger A. Sedjo, and John W. Reid, Valuing Biodiversity
for Use in Pharmaceutical Research, 104 Journal of Political Economy (1996).
54See generally Gordon C. Rausser and Arthur A. Small, Valuing Research Leads: Biodiver-
sity and the Conservation of Genetic Resources, 108 Journal of Political Economy (2000). See
also R. Mendelsohn and M. Bailick, The Value of Undiscovered Pharmaceuticals in Tropical
Forests, 49 Economic Botany (1995).
55See generally Norman R. Farnsworth, Djaja Doel Soejarto, Potential Consequences of
Plant Extinction in the United States on the Availability of Prescription Drugs, 39 Economic
Botany 231-240 (1985). See also generally Peter Principe, The Economic Value of Biodiversity
among Medicinal Plants (1989). See also Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life 281-
310 (1992). See also generally Walter V. Reid et al., A New Lease on Life in Biodiversity
Prospecting: Using Genetic Resources for Sustainable Development (EDs. Walter V. Reid
et al.) (1993). See also generally Steven M. Rubin and Stanwood C. Fish, Biodiversity
Prospecting: Using Innovative Contractual Provisions to Foster Ethnobotanical Knowledge,
Technology, and Conservation, 5 Colorado Journal of International Law and Policy 23-58
(1994).
56See generally Charles Weiss and Thomas Eisner, Partnerships for value-added through
bioprospecting, 20 Technology In Society (1998).
10If it is determined that biodiversity possesses a high economic use value, then
the potential may exist for resulting economic benets that could, in theory,
be equitably shared.57 On the other hand, if pessimistic estimates are more
accurate, and biodiversity holds little economic use value, then there may be
few benets available for sharing, equitable or otherwise.
Economist R. David Simpson, currently of the World Resources Institute58, has
developed an innovative analytic framework for calculating the economic value
of biodiversity in terms of its potential for the development of pharmaceutical
products.59 The model upon which his analyses are based attempts to take into
account the way in which novel pharmaceuticals are discovered:
Pharmaceutical research on natural products is more often intended to de-
velop leads than to identify natural products that can be used in an essentially
unmodied form. Leads are promising molecules: blueprints of compounds that
must be modied to increase ecacy or reduce side eects. Part of the rea-
son for the increased recent interest in natural products research is a renewed
appreciation of the importance of natural leads. While considerable eorts at
rational design of drugs from inorganic materials continue, researchers have also
come to recognize that nature has perfected chemicals that synthetic chemists
might never dream up.60
Genetic resources and natural products are assumed to be nonrival goods61,
meaning that use of any particular lead by one will not prevent the equivalent use
by others. The model takes into account the evolving national and international
legal frameworks in which the aspirations of the CBD are being implemented
either de facto (in the form of contracts between commerical bioprospectors
57See, e.g., CBD Article 1 http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art1.htm (2000).
58See organization hompage http://www.wri.org (2000).
59See, e.g., R. David. Simpson, Roger A. Sedjo, and John W. Reid, Valuing Biodiversity
for Use in Pharmaceutical Research, 104 Journal of Political Economy (1996).
60See R. David. Simpson, Roger A. Sedjo, and John W. Reid, Valuing Biodiversity for Use
in Pharmaceutical Research, 104 Journal of Political Economy 166 (1996).
61See id.
11and biodiversity source countries) or de jure (in the form of formally legislated
access agreements that govern availability to and use of biodiversity resources).62
The analysis also relies on the assumption that the full set of genetic resources
contained within all of biodiversity contains signicant redundancy with respect
to the provision of pharmaceutical leads.63 The model and its predictions are
described as follows:
[We] derive a simple demand function for biodiversity in pharmaceutical re-
search, determine the willingness to pay for the marginal species, and consider
the sensitivity of the value of the marginal species to the probability of discovery
and assumptions concerning overall protability. The intuition behind our re-
sults is easily grasped by considering extreme cases. If all species are promising
sources of leads, most would be redundant and the marginal species close to
valueless. If no species are likely sources of leads, it is unlikely that two or more
will prove redundant but also unlikely that any species will prove to have value.
Increasing the likelihood of success with any species has two osetting eects
on the value of the marginal species: it increases the expected payo in the
event the species is tested, but it also decreases the expected payo inasmuch
as it is more likely that another equally valuable species is discovered rst. By
identifying the probability of success at which these eects are balanced, we can
derive an upper bound on the value of the marginal species. As the number of
species available for testing increases, this upper bound declines.64
Using a number of optimistic assumptions and empirical data regarding the
sources and development costs of new drugs, the analysis yielded an estimate
62See id. 166-167.
63See R. David. Simpson, Roger A. Sedjo, and John W. Reid, Valuing Biodiversity for Use
in Pharmaceutical Research, 104 Journal of Political Economy 168-169 (1996) ([There] are
several reasons why genetic resources may be relatively redundant. First, the same species may
be found over a wide range. If all representatives of a species produce a particular compound,
individuals in excess of the number needed to maintain a viable population are redundant.
Second, there are numerous instances in which indentical drugs, or drugs with similar clinical
properties, have been isolated from dierent species...It may also be the case that there
are a host of other sources of common compounds that remain undiscovered because current
sources are adequate. Given the numerous examples of parallel morphological development
in the evolution literature, it should not be surprising to nd that dierent organisms that
have evolved in similar ecological niches have developed similar chemicals.Finally, there is a
dimension of what we might call medicinal redundancy. Dierent therapeutic mechanisms
may be eective in treating the same symptoms. Moreover, while the inventiveness of nature
in developing useful compounds is much extolled as a factor in the increased demand for
natural products for pharmacological research, synthesis from nonorganic sources may also
yield substitutes for natural product leads.).
64See id. 169.
12that the maximum value of the marginal species was $9 431; this translates into
a maximum economic value for bioprospecting of $20 per hectare in the most
biodiverse region on earth - western Ecuador - and considerably less elsewhere.65
The authors conclude:
[Given reasonable assumptions] it seems quite likely that the perceived value
of the marginal species will be miniscule. This view seems to be consistent with
information concerning observed transactions. This subject should be studied
further, but we would not expect a reversal of the conclusion of our analysis: the
private value of the marginal species for use in pharmaceutical research and, by
extension, the incentive to conserve the marginal hectare of threatened habitat
are negligible.66
Thus, under this model, bioprospecting would appear to be an economically
questionable endeavor, and would be unlikely to provide sucient incentives to
conserve biodiversity through the equitable sharing of benets envisioned by the
framers of the CBD.67
A subsequent analysis adapted the model of Simpson et al. to reect more
accurately the great importance of information rents in drug development.68
It criticized the accuracy of results generated using the original model.69 The
65See id. 180.
66See id. 183.
67See, e.g., CBD Article 1 http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art1.htm (2000).
68See generally Gordon C. Rausser and Arthur A. Small, Valuing Research Leads: Bio-
prospecting and the Conservation of Genetic Resources, 108 Journal of Political Economy
(2000).
69See id. 174-175. ([The conclusion reached using the previous model] ows specically
from a stylized description of the research process as one of brute-force testing, unaided by an
organizing scientic framework. Given the progress of biological and ecological science, the
realism of this assumption is suspect. While exceptions can be noted, it is a powerfully general
rule that no one ever searches for anything by examining large collections of objects in random
order. The essence of ecient search is the identication of clues that allow the universe of
potential leads to be narrowed down. Expensive tests are then conducted, ideally, only on
that handful of prospects that show special promise. In research targeting the development of
innovations, the clues that identify those prospects are provided by scientic models - maps
of the world that highlight areas in which the productivity of research eort is likely to be
highest. The ability of models to point out rich veins of ore explains exactly why applied
researchers acquaint themselves with basic theory. It is substantially from this ability that
the human capital of an applied research scientist derives its value. Brute-force search - the
13amended analysis was structured to account explicitly for the importance of
information rents for promising leads:
[In bioprospecting], leads of unusual promise are distinguished with the aid
of scientic information gleaned from elds such as ecology and taxonomy. Re-
searchers can, and do, draw on rich bases of publicly available data describing
the location and properties of plants, animals, and microbes, their evolutionary
history, and their survival and reproductive strategies. These data, when l-
tered through a model that makes sense of them, can serve to tag those creatures
most likely to display economically valuable characteristics. Just as a catalog
helps a library patron to focus quickly on those few volumes that are most likely
to contain information she desires, so can an ecological model parse the living
world into categories suggesting potential use.
Through product dierentiation, scientic understanding generates informa-
tion rents: if a particular lead is believed to show promise as an aid to a lucrative
research discovery, a rational investigator will be willing to pay an access fee.
This principle is fundamental to understanding how genetic resources will be, or
should be, valued in the marketplace. In particular, it is central to an analysis
that identies conditions under which bioprospecting creates eective market-
based nancial incentives for biodiversity conservation. Rents accrue to the
owners of leads as they absorb part of the knowledge spillovers generated by
publicly available science.70
Using the same numerical examples employed by Simpson et al.71, results
from the amended model showed biodiversity as possessing much greater eco-
nomic value for bioprospecting.72 For example, the amended model valued a
hectare of western Ecuador at almost $9 200 for purposes of bioprospecting,
or roughly 450 times greater than that calculated by Simpson et al.73 Such a
result suggests that signicant economic benets might attend bioprospecting.
Another method used to assess the economic value of biodiversity for bio-
sequential testing of large numbers of leads in no particular order - is by contrast a nearly
cost-maximizing approach to discovery. It is deployed, if at all, only as a backstop technology,
when all possibilities for directed search have been exhausted.).
70See id. 176.
71See R. David. Simpson, Roger A. Sedjo, and John W. Reid, Valuing Biodiversity for Use
in Pharmaceutical Research, 104 Journal of Political Economy 178 (Table 2) (1996).
72See Gordon C. Rausser and Arthur A. Small, Valuing Research Leads: Bioprospecting
and the Conservation of Genetic Resources, 108 Journal of Political Economy 194 (2000).
73See id. 193-194 (especially Table 1).
14prospecting involves analyzing the sources of drugs already on the market. The
most comprehesive such assessment conducted to date concluded that most
of the top 150 brand name drugs prescribed in the U.S. in 199374 contain a
compound derived from or patterned after a constituent of biodiversity.75 The
study concluded that 57% of the top 150 prescription drugs were derived di-
rectly or indirectly from biodiversity: 23% from animals, 18% from plants, 11%
from fungi, 4% from bacteria76, and 1% from marine organisms.77 Some indi-
vidual species were found to provide the source for multiple drugs in the top
150, the most prodigious being opium poppy (Papaver somniferum) with 15,
joint r (Ephedra sinica) with 11, bread mold (Penicillium notatum) with 9, a
fungus (Cephalosporium acremonium) with 7, Brazilian fer-de-lance (Bothrops
jararaca) and a eubacterium (Streptomyces erythreus) with 4 each, and human
(Homo sapiens) with 3.78 Given the huge research and development costs of
successfully bringing a new drug to market - estimated to average $300-500
million79 - these results suggest biodiversity as an important, possibly even the
most important, avenue for the discovery and development of new drugs.
Direct estimates have been also been attempted on the magnitude of the annual
74From January to September.
75See generally Francesca Grifo, David Newman, Alexandra S. Faireld, Bhaswati Bhat-
tacharya, and John T. Grupenho, The Origins of Prescription Drugs in Biodiversity and
Human Health (Eds. Francesca Grifo and Joshua Rosenthal) (1997).
76Although the authors do not specify what is meant by this term, it is likely that organisms
grouped under this heading are mostly eubacteria rather than archaea. Formerly, both eubac-
teria and arachaea were grouped under the arbitrary label bacteria, but are now recognized
to be widely divergent lineages of life. See http://phylogeny.arizona.edu/tree/life.html
(2000). See also D.M. Ward, A natural species concept for prokaryotes, 1 Current Opinion In
Microbiology 271-277 (1998).
77See Francesca Grifo, David Newman, Alexandra S. Faireld, Bhaswati Bhattacharya, and
John T. Grupenho, The Origins of Prescription Drugs in Biodiversity and Human Health
(Eds. Francesca Grifo and Joshua Rosenthal) 137 (Table 6.2) (1997).
78See id. 138.
79See Bruce Agnew, When Pharma Merges, R & D Is the Dowry, 287 Science 1952 (2000).
15markets for commercial products derived from biodiversity (including both nat-
ural products and genetic resources).80 Because the margins of error in these
calculations are considerable, both high and low estimates were developed (Ta-
ble 1).
Table 1. Estimates for Annual Markets for Products Derived from Biodiversity81
Sector Market (US$ billion) LOWMarket (US$ billion) HIGH
Pharmaceuticals 75 150
Botanical medicines 20 40
Agricultural produce 300+ 450+
Ornamental plants 16 19
Crop protection prod-
ucts
0.6 3
Other biotechnology 60 120
Personal care & cosmet-
ics
2.8 2.8
Rounded total 500 800
These estimates also suggest that products derived directly or indirectly from
biodiversity possess signicant economic value. In fact, when pharmaceuticals
(the subjects of the analyses presented above) are considered along with other
commercial products derived from biodiversity, the total economic value of bio-
diversity is considerable. Interestingly, the high estimate of the total in Table
1 ($800 billion) is quite similar to the estimate derived from rst principles at
80See Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity - Access to
Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 57 (1999).
81This table is fully adapted from Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial
Use of Biodiversity - Access to Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 2 (Table 1.1) (1999).
16the beginning of this section ($1 trillion).
In short, the weight of evidence from the few formal studies to assess the
economic use value of biodiversity suggests that its worth may be considerable.
Consequently, bioprospecting may indeed have the potential to generate signi-
cant economic benets, a necessary condition for the fair and equitable sharing
of those benets envisioned by the CBD.82
The Convention on Biological Diversity
The Convention on Biological Diversity's objectives are the conservation of bi-
ological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equi-
table sharing of the benets arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.
The Convention is thus the rst global, comprehensive agreement to address
all aspects of biological diversity: genetic resources, species, and ecosystems. It
recognizes - for the rst time - that the conservation of biological diversity is
a common concern of humankind and an integral part of the development pro-
cess. To achieve its objectives, the Convention - in accordance with the spirit
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development - promotes a renewed
partnership among countries. Its provisions on scientic and technical coop-
eration, access to genetic resources, and the transfer of environmentally sound
technologies form the foundations of this partnership.
- United Nations Biodiversity Secretariat83
The Convention on Biological Diversity is a distinctive source of interna-
tional law. It serves two main purposes.84 First, it is an international treaty
whose explicit goal is to conserve biodiversity comprehensively and at the global
level. Its scope is unprecedented in comparison to any other laws regarding the
82See, e.g., CBD Article 1 http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art1.htm (2000).
83See http://www.biodiv.org (2000).
84See http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art1.htm (2000).
17conservation of biodiversity. Second, it provides an institutional framework for
the promotion of scientic study of biodiversity, the development of policy for
its conservation and sustainable and equitable use, and the implementation of
legal mechanisms substantively to realize policy goals.
Other legal eorts to conserve biodiversity have been much more limited in
scope than the CBD. National laws, such as the U.S. Endangered Species Act85,
have attempted to conserve specic levels of biodiversity within the geographic
boundaries of individual countries. International treaties, such as the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna
(CITES)86 and the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(ICRW)87, have restricted themselves to well dened subsets of biodiversity. In
stark contrast, the CBD states as its rst and unqualied objective the conser-
vation of biological diversity.88
Over the course of the 1980s, pressure mounted for a more comprehensive ap-
proach to the conservation of biodiversity.89 In 1982, the U.N. General Assembly
passed the World Charter on Nature, a merely hortatory and nonbinding state-
ment about the value of conserving nature. Then, in 1987, the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP) set up a working group to investigate the pos-
85See 16 U.S.C. xx 1531 et seq.
86See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
March 3, 1973 http://www.cites.org/CITES/eng/index.shtml (2000). (An international
agreement that regulates and restricts trade in rare species or parts thereof.).
87See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/iwcoffice/IWC.htm (2000). (An international
agreement, administered through the International Whaling Commission, originally estab-
lished to manage the harvesting of whales at sustainable levels but that currently imposes a
moratorium on commerical whaling.).
88See http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art1.htm (2000).
89The history of the negotiation and implementation of the CBD that follows is based on
personal communications from Wendy E. Franz, international environmental politics scholar
in the Department of Government, Harvard University (2000).
18sibility of an international treaty to conserve biodiversity in a comprehensive
manner. In 1991, this working group became the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity.
The result was the Convention on Biological Diversity, which was opened to
participating countries for signature in 1992 at the United Nations Conference
on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio. Article 1 of the CBD
summarizes its content and scope:
Article 1. Objectives.
The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with its rel-
evant provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use
of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benets arising out
of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to ge-
netic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into
account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate
funding.90
A total of 176 countries and the European Union (EU) have formally ratied
the CBD.91
Although the original purpose envisioned for the treaty was simply the com-
prehensive international conservation of biodiversity, many developing countries
balked at such a single-minded objective, judging it an expensive unfunded man-
date they could ill aord. Furthermore, they demanded a fair share of whatever
economic benets owed from the biodiversity they would be expected to con-
serve. In response to the threat of boycott by the very countries that housed
most of the earth's biodiversity, the nal draft of the CBD emphasized access
to genetic resources and fair and equitable sharing of the benets owing from
90See http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art1.htm (2000).
91See http://www.biodiv.org/conv/pdf/ratification-date.pdf (2000).
19these resources. Consequently, the text of the CBD contains numerous provi-
sions that deal specically with the economic benets of biodiversity. They are
considered in order below.
This rst provision of the CBD that deals specically with bioprospecting ac-
tivities is Article 892(j). It provides that
[Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate:] Subject
to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innova-
tions and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diver-
sity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement
of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the
equitable sharing of the benets arising from the utilization of such knowledge,
innovations and practices93
This provision appears to eect the practice of bioprospecting in two main
ways. First, it emphasizes the value and encourages the ecient use of tradi-
tional knowledge gathered by indigenous and local peoples to develop useful or
marketable biodiversity-based products. However, it also places practical lim-
itations on such uses and insists that they should be voluntary and that the
benets therefrom should be shared with those whose knowledge contributed
to a product. An implicit requirement of this provision may be the securing
of prior informed consent from the relevant indigenous or local people for the
bioprospecting activity contemplated.94
Article 1595 deals most directly and comprehensively with the use and legal
treatment of genetic resources. Its seven provisions are reproduced below:
92CBD Article 8 is entitled In-situ Conservation.
93See http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art8.htm (2000).
94See Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity - Access to
Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 20 (1999).
95CBD Article 15 is entitled Access to Genetic Resources.
201 Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources,
the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national
governments and is subject to national legislation.
2 Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate
access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses by other Contracting
Parties and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the objectives of this
Convention.
3 For the purpose of this Convention, the genetic resources being provided
by a Contracting Party, as referred to in this Article and Articles 16 and 19, are
only those that are provided by Contracting Parties that are countries of origin
of such resources or by the Parties that have acquired the genetic resources in
accordance with this Convention.
4 Access, where granted, shall be on mutually agreed terms and subject to
the provisions of this Article.
5 Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed consent of
the Contracting Party providing such resources, unless otherwise determined by
that Party.
6 Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to develop and carry out scientic
research based on genetic resources provided by other Contracting Parties with
the full participation of, and where possible in, such Contracting Parties.
7 Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy mea-
sures, as appropriate, and in accordance with Articles 16 and 19 and, where
necessary, through the nancial mechanism established by Articles 20 and 21
with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and
development and the benets arising from the commercial and other utilization
of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources. Such
sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.96
Article 15 is important to the practice of bioprospecting for a variety of
reasons, but foremost for its explicit recognition in international law that states
possess sovereign rights over their natural resources (including biodiversity) and
can use these sovereign rights to establish legal regimes governing access to those
resources. Previous to this formal recognition there existed much uncertainty
and dispute regarding ownership over biodiversity. Many considered - and still
consider - biodiversity to be the collectively owned inheritance of all mankind or
96See http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art15.htm (2000).
21the unowned commons of nature97 However, more control over the biodiversity
within their own borders was a key demand by many developing countries and
their sine qua non for agreeing to the CBD.98
Acting as a counterweight to Article 15.1, Article 15.2 creates an obligation
for states to facilitate access to their genetic resources. Article 15.3 further
lessens burdens on access by appearing to exempt biodiversity resources col-
lected before the CBD entered into legal force99. Since the long history of
bioprospecting resulted in the collection of many biological samples (and their
deposit elsewhere than in the source country) before the CBD, Article 15.3
may create a signicant legal avenue for use of biodiversity unauthorized by the
country of origin. This could oer potential benets to institutions such as mu-
seums, herbaria, and botanical gardens whose collections include vast quantities
of potentially valuable biodiversity.100 It could also present a competitive threat
to source countries for potential bioprospecting revenue by oering commercial
bioprospectors an alternative source of biodiversity. Article 15.3 similarly ex-
empts biodiversity collected in countries outside the CBD; however, given the
high success rate of CBD ratication101, this loophole is of minor importance.
97See Guidelines for the Ecological Sustainability of Nonconsumptive and Consumptive
Uses of Wild Species, Article 10(b), Annex 1, IUCN Gen. Ass. Paper, G.A./19/94/3 (1994).
For additional information about the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) see organization homepage at http://iucn.org/index.html (2000).
98Personal communications from Wendy E. Franz, international environmental politics
scholar in the Department of Government, Harvard University (2000).
99The CBD became legally binding on its signatories on December 29, 1993, 90 days after
the 30th ratication. See http://www.biodiv.org/conv/BACKGROUND.HTML (2000).
100See, e.g., Alan Dove, Botanical Gardens Cope With Bioprospecting Loophole, 281 Science
1273 (1998).
101A total of 176 countries and the European Union (EU) have formally ratied the CBD.
See http://www.biodiv.org/conv/pdf/ratification-date.pdf (2000). By comparison, the
United Nations has 188 member states and two non-member states with permanent observer
missions. See http://www.un.org/Overview/missions.htm#nperm (2000).
22Articles 15.4 and 15.5 provide a framework for proper behavior between source
states and prospective bioprospectors interested in gaining access to genetic re-
sources. There are two general conditions.
The rst part of Article 15.4 - Access, where granted - suggests that source
states do not have to agree to provide access at all. However, if access is to
be granted, it shall be on mutually agreed terms between the source state and
the party seeking access. This grants the source state a great advantage during
negotiation because it can hold out for any terms it desires to be incorporated in
an access agreement, providing that such terms are consistent with the whole of
the CBD. The types of terms intended by this provision probably include those
that specify how the genetic resources of interest are to be legally acquired
(e.g., precisely where collecting may be conducted, what manner of collection
is permitted, under what sort of supervision collecting is to occur), what uses
of collected material are permitted (e.g., where research may be conducted,
whether material may be sold to others), how access to the material may be
restricted in the future, and how the source country and bioprospector intend
to share benets arising from research on, and development of, any biodiversity
collected.102
In addition to the detailed requirements of Article 15.4, Article 15.5 stipulates
that Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed consent of the
Contracting Party providing such resources. This also strengthens the hand of
source countries because it requires full disclosure by bioprospector of informa-
102See Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity - Access to
Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 22 (1999).
23tion pertinent to the negotiation of an access agreement. Prior informed consent
implies several necessary conditions to an access agreement.103 Informed con-
sent must be granted before the activity contemplated in the access agreement
may commence. Consent must be made in the context of full and truthful dis-
closure by the bioprospector regarding how, where, and from what source he
intends to collect the relevant genetic resources, what specic uses, commercial
or otherwise, he contemplates for those resources, and whether any third party
not involved in negotiating the access agreement will gain access to the resources
themselves or to any benets owing from them. Consent certainly refers to the
source country, but whether it also applies to other interested parties, such as
local or indigenous groups, is ambiguous. Prudent bioprospectors would likely
benet from securing prior informed consent from as many interested parties
as feasible to avoid potentially costly complications. Finally, the text of Article
15.5 appears allow a source country to exempt bioprospectors from having to ob-
tain prior informed consent. It is possible that bioprospectors who contemplate
becoming repeat players in a particular source country could earn themselves
future preferential treatment by ensuring that they act with obvious good faith
in scrupulously observing all the terms of their access agreement during the
course of their activities.
Article 15.6 is a hortatory provision that promotes two goals. First, states are
urged to promote scientic research into the benecial uses of genetic resources.
Increased levels of scientic research may have the salutary eect of increasing
103See id. 27.
24the real and perceived economic valuation of in situ biodiversity, thus accelerat-
ing the accrual of benets to both bioprospectors and source countries. Second,
any such research is to be conducted with the full participation of the source
country, and, ideally, within the borders of the source state. The sort of benets
that might result from such cooperative research initiatives include scientic and
technical training of source country personnel and enhanced alignment of inter-
ests in conserving biodiversity between source country, bioprospectors, and any
other parties to whom resulting benets ow. The importance of this provision
is probably minor due to its merely hortatory nature and the likelihood that
negotiations aimed at reaching access agreements undertaken in the context of
Article 15.4 will already have considered the inclusion or exclusion of such terms
into potential agreements.
Article 15.7 is also merely hortatory in nature. It urges countries that benet
from the fruits of bioprospecting (e.g., new biotechnologies, medicines, or agri-
cultural products) to share those benets equitably with countries from whose
biodiversity such benets were developed. However, they are granted a large
degree of discretion, and can employ whichever means they deem appropriate.
Even so, such agreements must still provide for mutually agreed terms.
Article 15.7 would seem to be directed more forcefully to benets developed
by the government of the source country itself, rather than non-governmental
actors. The National Cancer Institute104 (NCI), a member of the U.S. National
Institutes of Health105, provides a useful example of how this provision might
104See agency homepage at http://www.nci.nih.gov (2000).
105See agency homepage at http://www.nih.gov/icd (2000).
25be implemented. The NCI operates a large program to screen natural products
collected around the world for ecacy against cancer.106 The NCI requires com-
panies that commercialize products deemed promising in this screening process
to take part in a three-way contractual relationship called triangular privity: this
arrangement involves separate legally binding agreements between NCI and the
source country, NCI and its licensee, and source country and NCI licensee.107
The successful achievement of triangular privity necessarily involves more time
and higher transaction costs than the negotiation of a typical two-party con-
tract. However, it has two distinct advantages: (1) it demonstrates compliance
with the CBD by a part of the U.S. government; (2) it fosters good relations
with biodiversity source countries, helping to assure the continued access to
bioprospecting upon which NCI depends for leads in the search for new cancer
treatments.
Article 16.3108 urges that any technology developed using a source country's
genetic resources be transfered back to that source country on favorable terms.
Specically, it provides:
Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy mea-
sures, as appropriate, with the aim that Contracting Parties, in particular those
that are developing countries, which provide genetic resources are provided ac-
cess to and transfer of technology which makes use of those resources, on mutu-
ally agreed terms, including technology protected by patents and other intellec-
tual property rights, where necessary, through the provisions of Articles 20 and
106See Thomas D. Mays, Kate Duy-Mazan, Gordon Cragg, and Michael Boyd, A Paradigm
for the Equitable Sharing of Benets Resulting from Biodiversity Research and Development
in Biodiversity and Human Health (Eds. Francesca Grifo and Joshua Rosenthal) 267-270
(1997).
107See generally T.D. Mays, K. Duy-Mazan, G. Cragg, and M. Boyd, Triangular Privity - A
Working Paradigm for the Equitable Sharing of Benets from Biodiversity Research and De-
velopment in Global Genetic Resources: Access, Owneship, and Intellectual Property Rights
(Eds. K. Elaine Hoagland and Amy Y. Rossman) (1997).
108CBD Article 16 is entitled Access to and Transfer of Technology.
2621 and in accordance with international law and consistent with paragraphs 4
and 5 below.109
Implementation of this provision is substantially complicated by three mod-
ifying phrases: as appropriate, on mutually agreed terms, and where necessary.
It is further complicated by its potential conict with both national and TRIPs
legal regimes for patent protection.110 However, its attempt to align the in-
centives for the conservation of biodiversity of both source countries and other
countries deriving benets from bioprospecting accords well with the rst main
goal of the CBD111.
Article 19.1 and 19.2 echo and reinforce Articles 15.6, 15.7, and 16.3 by at-
tempting to ensure that source countries participate in and receive benets from
the research and development made possible by bioprospecting for their genetic
resources. Article 19.1 and 19.2 provide specically:
1 Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy
measures, as appropriate, to provide for the eective participation in biotech-
nological research activities by those Contracting Parties, especially developing
countries, which provide the genetic resources for such research, and where fea-
sible in such Contracting Parties.
2 Each Contracting Party shall take all practicable measures to promote and
advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis by Contracting Parties,
especially developing countries, to the results and benets arising from biotech-
nologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Contracting Parties.
Such access shall be on mutually agreed terms.112
109See http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art16.htm (2000).
110It is premature to decide how the intellectual property provisions in Article 16.3 of the
CBD will interact with the WTO-TRIPs agreement negotiated subsequently. See organiza-
tion homepage at http://www.wto.org (2000). Such interaction may be signicant because
membership in these two agreements overlaps substantially.
111The rst objective listed in the text of the CBD Article 1 is the conservation of biological
diversity. See http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art1.htm (2000).
112See http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art19.htm (2000).
27However, Article 19 also serves a second distinct function that is likely to
have an increasing, though indirect, impact on bioprospecting for genetic re-
sources. It provides guidelines for what has become known as biosafety113. The
text specically provides:
3 The Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a protocol
setting out appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed
agreement, in the eld of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living mod-
ied organism resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse eect on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
4 Each Contracting Party shall, directly or by requiring any natural or legal
person under its jurisdiction providing the organisms referred to in paragraph
3 above, provide any available information about the use and safety regulations
required by that Contracting Party in handling such organisms, as well as any
available information on the potential adverse impact of the specic organisms
concerned to the Contracting Party into which those organisms are to be intro-
duced.114
These provisions lacked much force until the 2000 Conference of the Parties
to the CBD agreed to the specic terms of the Biosafety Protocol. The Proto-
col implements Articles 19.3 and 19.4 by granting countries the legal authority
to deny the importation of any GMO or GMO-derived product if the country
deems it a threat to public health or the environment. The criterion used to
judge safety under the Protocol is an extremely expansive version of the precau-
tionary principle.115 Depending upon how it is interpreted and implemented,
the Biosafety Protocol could have a signicant impact on international trade
involving many products of biotechnology. The richest potential source of the
113Biosafety refers to safeguards against the negative eects, either to humans, animals,
or the environment in general, of genetically modied organisms (GMOs). Given trends in
biotechnology, GMOs are likely to make up an increasing proportion of products derived from
genetic resources collected by bioprospecting.
114See http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art16.htm (2000).
115See http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/Biosafe-Prot.html (2000).
28genetic resources needed to create GMOs is biodiversity. Thus, the Biosafety
Protocol has the potential to inuence decisions regarding whether or not to
invest in bioprospecting for novel genetic resources. Ironically, many of the
countries who championed the Biosafety Protocol would also stand to gain most
from increased bioprospecting for the genetic resources whose use the Protocol
would restrict.116
Complete implementation of the provisions of the CBD relating to bio-
prospecting will likely take a many years, especially among less developed coun-
tries with weak institutional bases for legislation and enforcement.117 Con-
sequently, it is unclear how the above provisions will function in practice or
interact with each other and with other sources of law. However, it is likely
that the CBD will have a signicant impact on bioprospecting.
Implementation
Since the CBD was opened for signatures in 1992, countries, government
agencies, companies, and non-prot organizations have begun to implement the
treaty. The provisions relating to the regulation of bioprospecting have received
considerable attention. In order to provide an indication of how access agree-
ments are being implemented, a number of examples are explored below.
116Personal communications from Wendy E. Franz, international environmental politics
scholar in the Department of Government, Harvard University (2000).
117See id.
29The Philippines is ideally suited to prot from the provisions in the CBD pro-
moting equitable sharing of benets from bioprospecting. It possesses one of the
greatest concentrations of biodiversity on earth118 as well as a legal structure
to govern access to these resources. The Phillippines has erected a comprehen-
sive procedure that rms interested in bioprospecting there must follow. The
domestic legal basis for this procedure is the Philippines Executive Order 247
and Implementing Regulations that cover bioprospecting.119 The following is a
summary of how these regulations function in practice:
1 The applicant must submit a Letter of Intent and three copies of the
Research Proposal to the Inter-Agency Committee on Biological and Genetic
Resources (IACBGR) through the Technical Secretariat and pay a ling fee of
P25120.
2 The Technical Secretariat conducts an initial screening of the application to
determine whether the research is within the coverage of the Executive Order.
3 If the proposed research is within the coverage of the Executive Order then:
(a) the Technical Secretariat provides the applicant with a checklist of addi-
tional requirements to be submitted which include, among other things, (i) a
properly completed application form, (ii) a prole of the organisation seeking
access, (iii) an Environmental Impact Assessment, as determined by the Techni-
cal Secretariat, and (iv) the correct processing fee (P1,000 per application for a
Philippine national, P2,000 for a foreign national)121; (b) the applicant submits
a copy of the summary of the research proposal, duly certied by the Technical
Secretariat, to the recognised head of the indigenous peoples, municipal or city
mayor of the Local Governmental Unit, Protected Area Management Board, or
private land-owner on whose land the bioprospecting is to take place for the
required Prior Informed Consent Certicate122.
118See Norman Myers, Russell A. Mittermeier, Cristina G. Mittermeier, Gustavo A.B. da
Fonseca, and Jennifer Kent, Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities, 403 Nature
853-858 (2000).
119See Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity - Access to
Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 18 (1999).
120P refers to Philippine Pesos: 1 Philippine Peso = 0.02443 US Dollar as of March 30, 2000;
so, P25 = $0.61.
121These fees are equivalent to $24.43 for a Philippine national and $48.86 for a foreign
national. See id.
122Prior informed consent refers to the consent obtained by the applicant from the Local
Community, Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (IP), Protected Area
304 If the research proposal is not within the coverage of the Executive Order,
the Technical Secretariat issues a Certicate of Exemption and refers the pro-
posal to the government agency that has jurisdiction over the project.
5 The applicant submits the Prior Informed Consent Certicate signed by the
recognised head of the indigenous peoples, municipal or city mayor of the Local
Governmental Unit, Protected Area Management Board, or private land-owner
concerned, together with proofs of public notication and sectoral consultation.
6 The Technical Secretariat conducts an intial review and evaluation of the
application and documents.
7 The Technical Secretariat submits the results of its evaluation, including
the draft Commercial Research Agreement, to the IACBGR within 30 days from
receipt of all requirements.
8 The IACBGR conducts a nal evaluation of the application.
9 The IACBGR submits its recommendation to the Agency concerned.
10 The Secretary of the Agency concerned considers the approval or disap-
proval of the Research Agreement.
11 Upon approval of the application, the applicant pays the bioprospecting
fee as determined by the IACBGR.
12 The Agency concerned transmits the signed Research Agreement to the
Technical Secretariat who then furnishes a copy to the applicant, indigenous
peoples, local community, Protected Area Management Board, or private land-
owner concerned.123
Clearly the process by which one gains legal approval for bioprospecting in
the Philippines is lengthy and complicated. Prior informed consent can be re-
quired not simply from multiple governmental agencies but from multiple local
stakeholders (e.g., indigenous peoples, private land-owners). Given the appar-
ent necessity of securing such a sophisticated level of permission from so many
actors, the potential for hold-out situations is signicant at many stages of the
approval process. Although the ocial application fees are de minimus124, the
total transaction costs of approval from all necessary parties, and the opportu-
Management Board (PAMB) or Private Land Owner concerned, after disclosing fully the intent
and scope of the bioprospecting activity, in a language and process understandable to the
community, and before any bioprospecting activity is undertaken., Philippines Implementing
Regulations x2, reproduced in Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of
Biodiversity - Access to Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 28 (1999).
123See Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity - Access to
Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 30 (adapted from Box 2.6) (1999).
124They amount to less than $50. See supra note 110.
31nity cost of time spent in that endeavor, is likely to be much greater.
The complexity and expense of navigating the Philippines' regulatory system
has caused considerable concern among prospective commercial bioprospectors.
Firms perceive its major shortcomings as including (1) excessive bureaucracy,
(2) high nancial costs of complying with detailed procedures, (3) inexibility
to the dierent requirements of individual rms, and (4) compulsory licensing of
technology.125 In fact, the perception of the Philippines' access system as overly
burdensome has inuenced at least some companies to forego bioprospecting
there and instead to seek out more favorable terms of access to biodiversity
elsewhere.126 One source of these diculties may be the failure by the Philip-
pines government to involve industry in the drafting of regulatory procedures to
implement Executive Order 247.127 However, the Philippines government has
responded by seeking input from parties potentially interested in conducting
bioprospecting there, emphasizing that the access regulations are intended to
be exible, and attempting to improve their administration.128 It remains to
be seen whether these somewhat supercial reforms can attract a greater share
of commerical bioprospecting to the Philippines.
Perhaps the most well known example of a legal regime governing access to bio-
diversity involves the National Biodiversity Institute of Costa Rica (INBio)129.
125See Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity - Access to
Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 294 (1999).
126See id. 301.
127See id. 294.
128See id.
129See INBio homepage (English version) at http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/default.html
(2000).
32Established in 1989, well before the CBD existed, INBio's purpose is to enhance
the benets that accrue to Costa Rica from the use of its abundant biodiver-
sity. Like the Philippines, Costa Rica contains a disproportionate share of the
earth's biodiversity.130 For many years it has been a popular destination for
both academic scientists and commercial bioprospectors interested in studying
and collecting its biodiversity, in part because of its stable political climate.
However, recognition of the potential value of its biodiversity resources and dis-
enchantment with its negligible share of the benets derived therefrom led Costa
Rica to pass Biodiversity Law 7788131. Costa Rica hopes to derive signicant
benets from its biodiversity: Bioprospecting stands as the industry of the next
century and Costa Rica has a unique opportunity to lead the process.132
INBio established the prototype for later access agreements when it concluded
a commercial agreement to supply Merck & Company, Inc.133, a large multina-
tional pharmaceutical company, with 10,000 chemical samples from a variety of
Costa Rican organisms in return for a $1 million payment, $130,000 worth of
modern research equipment, and future royalties (at an undisclosed rate) on the
total prots of any commercial product successfully developed from the INBio
samples.134 INBio's strategy is based on the development of a diversied port-
folio of bioprospecting research agreements that foster innovation, learning and
130See Norman Myers, Russell A. Mittermeier, Cristina G. Mittermeier, Gustavo A.B. da
Fonseca, and Jennifer Kent, Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities, 403 Nature
853-858 (2000).
131Article 63 of the Biodiversity Law specically deals with issues of access to biodiversity.
132See http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/Prosp.html (2000).
133See corporate homepage at http://www.merck.com (2000).
134See David R. Downes, New Diplomacy for the Biodiversity Trade: Biodiversity, Biotech-
nology and Intellectual Property in the Convention on Biological Diversity, 4 Touro J.
Transnational Law 1-8 (1993).
33local capacity building.135 It has had considerable success in attracting parties
interested in access to Costa Rican biodiversity and successfully negotiating ac-
cess agreements.136 Nevertheless, the total amount of direct revenue generated
by these access agreements thus far has been modest;137 indirect benets, such
as infrastructure, scientic and technical training, and development of legal ex-
pertise in negotiating favorable access agreements, are dicult to measure but
may be signicant. The perceived success of the INBio model for bioprospecting
has even inspired Mexico to set up a similar institution, CONABIO, that has
begun to attract commercial bioprospecting clients.138
Many other legal access regimes exist in addition to those set up by the Philip-
pines and Costa Rica, though few are as comprehensive or well established.139
Of particular note, however, is a regional agreement known as the Andean Pact
Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources. In 1996, Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela successfully agreed to an common legal regime
for granting access agreements for bioprospecting.140 Among the motivations
for a common regime was the desire to avoid unnecessary competition between
135See http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/Prosp.html (2000).
136INBio has successfully concluded access agreements with Universidad de Costa Rica,
Universidad Nacional, Escuela Agr cola de la Regi on del Tr opico H umedo (EARTH), In-
stituto Tecnol ogico de Costa Rica (ITCR), Strathclyde University, D usseldorf University,
Lausanne University, University of Massachusetts, Cornell University, Bristol Myers Squibb,
Merck & Co., Ecos-La Pac ca, Indena, Givaudan Roure, Diversa, and other parties. See
http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/Prosp.html (2000).
137See http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/Prosp.html (2000). (From an strict economic point
of view, since INBio started this activity in 1991, direct nancial contributions to other divi-
sions in INBio, the Conservation Areas, MINAE and national universities exceed $2.5 million
dollars.).
138See Harvey Bialy, A new look in North-South biopartnerships, 16 Nature Biotechnology
986 (1998).
139See Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity - Access
to Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 16 (1999). (The authors report 40 countries, and
several subnational jurisdictions, with access and benet-sharing measures at various stages
of development).
140Ocially called The Acuerdo de Cartagena.
34these similarly situated and richly biodiverse141 countries in trying to attract
commercial bioprospecting: establishing a region-wide access and benet shar-
ing regime makes it more dicult for bioprospectors to play one country o
against its neighbours to secure overly favourable conditions.142 Under the com-
mon regime, access agreements are negotiated by each national government but
must conform to the same general rules. To obtain access an application must
be submitted along with a project proposal and detailed request form.143 The
request form requires specic information regarding the nature of bioprospect-
ing activities contemplated by the applicant:
1 identication and legal status of the institution,
2 identication of the genetic resources provider or source, including the as-
sociated intangible components, if applicable,
3 identication of the researcher or national organization,
4 identication and curriculum vitae of the project director and counterparts,
5 a list of the activities to be carried out, and
6 the locality where the research project will take place, including exact co-
ordinates.144
Although the avowed purpose of the The Andean Pact access regime is to
increase the benets from bioprospecting that accrue to the countries in which
biodiversity samples are collected, it is likely to be greeted by industry negatively
as overly burdensome, just as the Philippines' access regime has been.145 On
141See Norman Myers, Russell A. Mittermeier, Cristina G. Mittermeier, Gustavo A.B. da
Fonseca, and Jennifer Kent, Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities, 403 Nature
853-858 (2000).
142See Graham Duteld, The Andean Pact Common System on Access to Genetic Resources:
A Commentary, http://users.ox.ac.uk/wgtrr/andpacomm.htm (1997).
143See Raul O. Castillo, The Andean Common Code for the Access to Genetic Resources: A
General Overview in Global Genetic Resources: Access, Owneship, and Intellectual Property
Rights (Eds. K. Elaine Hoagland and Amy Y. Rossman) 300 (1997).
144See id.
145See Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity - Access to
Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 32 (1999).
35the other hand, the Andean Pact countries do have the distinct advantage of
containing a disproportionate amount of the biodiversity resources on earth146,
which should enhances their attractiveness to bioprospectors. However, there
is insucient data as yet to conclude whether commercial bioprospecting will
avoid Andean Pact countries in favor of those with more accommodating access
regimes or accept more stringent terms of access in return for higher likelihoods
of bioprospecting success.
Regional access regimes similar to the Andean Pact regime may become
more common. In 1998, the governing council of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU)147 approved a model bill designed to regularize legal access regimes
across the continent as well as to secure ownership of intellectual property rights
for indigenous local communities.148 There is a lot of animosity towards bio-
prospecting throughout Africa based on perceptions of historical inequities: The
opposition is based partly on memories of colonial times, when areas of the con-
tinent were used as a free source of plants by sta from colonial powers' botanic
gardens.149 The model bill is aimed particularly at 'bioprospecting' by multi-
nationals.150 As with the Andean Pact regime, a primary motivation for a
pan-African legal access regime is to ensure that the maximum amount of ben-
ets from bioprospecting redound to Africans; a common regime is seen as a
146See Norman Myers, Russell A. Mittermeier, Cristina G. Mittermeier, Gustavo A.B. da
Fonseca, and Jennifer Kent, Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities, 403 Nature
853-858 (2000).
147See organization homepage (with membership list) at http://www.oau-oua.org (2000).
(The OAU has 53 member states.).
148See Africa seeks to assert rights to 'natural' drugs, 394 Nature 9 (1998).
149See Ehsan Masood, Old scores surface as African states face new opportunities, 392
Nature 540 (1998).
150See Ehsan Masood, Africa defends rights to indigenous knowledge, 392 Nature 423 (1998).
36means of avoiding a counterproductive race-to-the-bottom in access standards.
Conditions may be particularly favorable in Africa for agreeing to a model bill
because of the relative importance bioprospecting already has there: This de-
bate is particularly signicant in Africa, where phytomedicine is an integral part
of traditional medical practice, and where it is estimated that up to 80% of the
population resort to traditional medicine for their health needs, including those
who also visit modern health facilities.151 The tremendous wealth of biodiver-
sity in Africa152 coupled with its very low level of economic development may
also provide impetus to a common access regime. An access regime common
to an entire continent would likely have a global impact on the practice of bio-
prospecting.
It is dicult to draw general observations based on the very limited number of
access agreements that have been implemented thus far. However, what limited
evidence there is suggests two conclusions. First, countries that insist on cum-
bersome and inexible terms of access (e.g., the Philippines) have not been as
successful in attracting commerical bioprospecting as have countries who oer
more exible and cooperative terms (e.g., Costa Rica, Mexico). Second, legal
access regimes are increasingly being contemplated at the regional, rather than
national, level.
Technological Challenges
151See Lydia Makhubu, Bioprospecting in an African Context, 282 Science 41 (1998).
152See Norman Myers, Russell A. Mittermeier, Cristina G. Mittermeier, Gustavo A.B. da
Fonseca, and Jennifer Kent, Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities, 403 Nature
853-858 (2000).
37From the soon-to-be-completed Human Genome Project to combinatorial chem-
istry, scientic advances are poised to revolutionize drug discovery and even
health care.
- Special Report on Drug Discovery in Science153
Two technologies developed in the late 1990s promise to have a profound
impact on the development of new drugs: genomics154 and combinatorial chem-
istry155. Both hold the potential systematically to alter the usefulness of biodi-
versity for drug discovery. However, it is unclear as yet whether this alteration
in value is likely to be upwards or downwards.
The nascent discipline of genomics accelerated rapidly during the 1990s due to
a variety of developments. The Human Genome Project (HGP) was established
in 1990 to nd the estimated 100,000 or more human genes and determine the
sequence of the 3-billion DNA basepairs.156 Among it many eects, the HGP ac-
celerated the development of new technology able to sequence DNA more quickly
and eciently. In the ensuing years, these improvements have allowed the com-
plete sequencing of the genomes of more than 20 species.157 Furthermore, a
153See Julia Uppenbrink and Jerey Mervis, An Information Revolution - Introduction, 287
Science 1951 (2000).
154The study of genomes, which includes genome mapping, gene sequencing and
gene function., See Life Science Dictionary, Biotech Resources and Indiana University
http://biotech.icmb.utexas.edu/search/dict-search.phtml?title=genomics (2000).
155A combinatorial chemist, or chemical geneticist, synthesizes vast numbers of small
molecules (using a strategy named split-and- pool synthesis), chooses from the myriad of
methods to synthesize complex, asymmetric, natural product-like molecules, and selects the
desired ligands through the use of screens compatible with the split-and-pool method of small
molecule generation. See Stuart Schreiber (Morris Loeb Professor of Chemical Biology in the
Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard University) lab group website
http://www-schreiber.chem.harvard.edu/home/research.html (2000).
156See Human Genome Project website at http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human Genome/hg5yp
(2000).
157These include: Mycoplasma genitalium, Rickettsia prowazekii, Haemophilus inuen-
zae, Methanococcus jannaschi, Bacillus subtilis, Escherichia coli, Saccharmomyces cere-
visiae,Caenorhabditis elegans, and Drosophila melanogaster. See Benjamin Lewin, Genes
VII 75 (2000).
38commerical biotechnology rm, Celera Genomics158, recently announced that it
had completed sequencing more than 90% of the human genome and identied
more than 97% of human genes159; the company expects to complete the entire
human genome in 2000, three years ahead of the HGP.
Genomics should provide a powerful means for developing drugs. Instead of
approaching drug design as the application of external chemicals (many of them
natural products or products derived therefrom), drugs will be based on an
understanding of how genes, proteins, and the cells that house them, behave.
This approach is often called rational drug design. The technique has already
demonstrated its advantages in the development of novel antibiotics:
Traditionally, antimicrobial drug discovery has relied upon random screen-
ing or semi-rational modication of known structural series. These strategies
have failed to deliver sucient molecular diversity to counteract the contstant
selection pressures within the clinic, resulting in substantial and increasing drug
resistance...The new technologies based upon microbial genomics not only pro-
vide the tools to drive target discovery beyond established biochemistry but also
create the ability to compare targets for likely performance in a clinical situation.
The technologies are not limited to target selection and are providing new ap-
proaches to support compound optimization into early drug development. This
not only streamlines accurate compound evalutation but also converts random
screening campaigns into rational compound optimizations, thus revolutionizing
both antibacterial and antifungal drug screening. We can thus expect a whole
variety of novel agents with new mechanisms of action, of unrelated structural
classes, to be generated from increasingly ecient drug-hunting programs.160
An additional advantage of a genomic approach may be the ability to tailor
the design and application of drugs to the specic characteristics of an individ-
ual's genes:
Imagine the benet to the development of new therapies if drugs entering
158See Celera Genomics homepage at http://www.celera.com (2000).
159See http://www.pecorporation.com/press/prccorp011000.html (2000).
160See John Rosamond and Aileen Allsop, Harnessing the Power of the Genome in the
Search for New Antibiotics, 287 Science 1973 (2000).
39clinical trials are almost ensured to be well tolerated in the body and to have
the desired eect. Or imagine relatively short clinical trials, conrmatory nal
tests to guarantee that drugs and diagnostics are safe and eective.161
In short, genomics is likely to revolutionize the design of new drugs. But
how will genomics eect bioprospecting?
Some have suggested that genomics heralds the decline of bioprospecting by
reducing the need for natural products in drug hunting.162 However, even if
the demand for natural products were to be reduced, the demand for what the
CBD calls genetic resources163 is likely to increase:
Where past bioprospecting activity has concentrated on the collection and
identication of natural chemicals which organisms may use to protect them-
selves against predators or disease, the emphasis in future will be on the collec-
tion of genetic information from exotic species, for possible application in both
genetic medicine and genetic engineering of crops.164
So powerful is the view that the genetic component of biodiversity is eco-
nomically valuable that Celera Genomics recently amended its business plan
(that is, to become the denitive source of genomic and related agricultural and
medical information165) to include the sequencing of other species in addition to
the human.166 In short, genomics would seem to hold the potential to enhance
the value of the genetic component of biodiversity by making its extraction and
manipulation much more ecient and less expensive.
161See Chris Sander, Genomic Medicine and the Future of Health Care, 287 Science 1977
(2000).
162See Colin Mcilwain, When rhetoric hits reality in debate on bioprospecting, 392 Nature
537 (1998).
163See, e.g., CBD Article 1 http://www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/art1.htm (2000).
164See Colin Mcilwain, When rhetoric hits reality in debate on bioprospecting, 392 Nature
535 (1998).
165See http://www.pecorporation.com/press/prccorp011000.html (2000).
166See, e.g., http://www.pecorporation.com/press/prccorp011000.html (2000) (Announc-
ing the planned sequencing of the house mouse (Mus musculus) genome after completion of
the fruit y (Drosophila melanogaster) and human genomes).
40Even more than genomics, combinatorial chemistry has been heralded as
eliminating the need for natural products yielded by bioprospecting.167 After
all, the technique oers a powerful and highly ecient means of synthesizing
large numbers of small molecules168 that can be screened for ecacy as drugs.169
However, despite its tremendous promise, the view that it will completely replace
natural products is exaggerated because combinatorial libraries170 are usually
generated using natural products as templates.171 Furthermore, the perceived
failure of combinatorial chemistry to yield successful drugs may be spurring a
renaissance in bioprospecting for natural products:
...drug discovery is on a back-to-nature trip. In the past two years, scores
of small companies have set up alongside the major pharmaceutical rms to
nd and screen chemical compounds from hundreds of thousands of plants and
micro-organisms...combinatorial chemistry is limited by the imaginations of
the chemists who do it, and the range of chemical reactions they can devise.
As a result, its products frequently fail to pass laboratory tests for biological
function. In contrast, nature's molecules have already proved their usefulness
in the ultimate screening programme: over three and a half billion years of
evolution.172
In reality, it is unlikely that either approach - bioprospecting for natural
products or combinatorial chemistry - will alone be sucient in the near future.
Rather, they will often be used in tandem:
Most natural products researchers feel that natural products and combina-
167See Colin Mcilwain, When rhetoric hits reality in debate on bioprospecting, 392 Nature
535 (1998).
168See Biotech's secret garden, The Economist (May 30 U.S. Edition) 75 (1998). (up to
40,000 separate compounds in a single experiment.).
169See generally Stuart L. Schreiber, Target-Oriented and Diversity-Oriented Organic Syn-
thesis in Drug Discovery, 287 Science 1964-1968 (2000).
170The collection of distinct chemical species generated by combinatorial chemistry.
171For example, in the context of protein dimerization: Thus far, with only few exceptions,
the ligands used have been either natural products or their synthetic variants (e.g., synthetic
dimers of natural products). See Stuart Schreiber (Morris Loeb Professor of Chemical Biology
in the Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard University) lab group
website at http://www-schreiber.chem.harvard.edu/home/research.html (2000).
172See Biotech's secret garden, The Economist (May 30 U.S. Edition) 75 (1998).
41torial chemistry are complementary approaches to drug discovery, with combi-
natorial chemistry providing large quantities of similar compounds, and natural
products providing diversity.173
However, as techniques and technology improve, combinatorial chemistry
would seem to represent a medium to long term threat to bioprospecting for
natural products, particularly as the de novo design of templates (a major goal
of the next generation of combinatorial chemistry techniques) becomes more
feasible and begins to replace natural product templates.
Both genomics and combinatorial chemistry oer great improvements in the
design of new drugs. However, neither approach is likely to replace bioprospect-
ing in the near future. In fact, the potential exists for the commercial value of
biodiversity to be enhanced as aspects of it (especially genetic resources) become
more easily isolated and manipulated for the design of new drugs.
Conclusion
Bioprospecting has historically been a dominant source for medicines and
agricultural products. It remains a signicant source for these, and a variety of
other, economic goods. In the developing world, the vast majority of the popula-
tion regularly relies on natural products as their main source of medicine. Even
in the developed world, a majority of the most-prescribed prescription drugs are
either natural products themselves or substantially derived therefrom. Genetic
173See Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity - Access to
Genetic Resources and Benet-Sharing 57 (1999).
42resources represent a rapidly growing and highly promising source of new drugs,
agricultural products, and other fruits of biotechnology.
The economic value of the products derived from biodiversity (e.g., as a source
for the development of new drugs) is dicult to assess. A rst order approxi-
mation, based on the value of genetic resources alone, indicates the possibility
that biodiversity has high economic use value. Theoretical economic estimates
of biodiversity's value for drug development range from negligible to relatively
high. Estimates of sales of perscription drugs made or derived from natural
products are relatively large; when combined with agricultural products simi-
larly derived, the estimated economic use value of biodiversity becomes quite
large.
The Convention on Biological Diversity, introduced in 1992 at the United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development, represents a landmark at-
tempt to establish an international legal framework for the comprehensive con-
servation of global biodiversity. It recognizes national sovereignty over biodi-
versity and promotes the fair and equitable sharing of the benets that ow
from that resource. The CBD contemplates that such benets will be generated
by natural products and genetic resources collected through bioprospecting and
developed into commercial products like drugs and crops.
A growing number of countries have begun to implement the CBD by establish-
ing legal regimes governing access to their biodiversity resources. The Philip-
pines has established a strict and complicated access regime that is regarded
by potential commercial bioprospectors as excessively onerous. In contrast,
43Costa Rica and Mexico have set up a exible access regime that encourage bio-
prospecting agreements as potential sources of revenue, equipment moderniza-
tion, and expertise development. They have successfully developed partnerships
with commercial bioprospectors and have received both modest remuneration
and the promise of future royalties on successful commercial products devel-
oped from their biodiversity. Initial indications suggest that exible legal access
regimes are more successful in attracting bioprospecting clients.
The Andean Pact Regime may signal a trend towards the establishment of re-
gional bioprospecting access regimes, established in part to prevent unnecessary
competition between neighboring countries to attract commercial bioprospect-
ing. The Organization of African Unity is currently negotiating a legal access
regime that is similar in nature, but on the much grander scale of a whole
continent. The Andean Pact and OAU may herald a trend towards the region-
alization of legal access regimes for bioprospecting.
New technologies such as genomics and combinatorial chemistry may represent
challenges to the importance of bioprospecting. However, they could enhance
the importance of biodiversity. Genetic resources may provide an important
source of raw material for biotechnology and natural products may provide
needed templates for the generation of synthetic combinatorial libraries. In any
case, neither technology is likely to eliminate the need for bioprospecting in the
short term.
From new drugs to improved crop strains, biodiversity remains vitally impor-
tant to human health and welfare. If the Convention on Biological Diversity
44is implemented in a manner that maximizes the benets from biodiversity and
equitably shares them with source countries, there will exist a substantial incen-
tive to conserve biodiversity. To fulll these objectives, source countries must
design legal access regimes exible and ecient enough both to encourage con-
tinued bioprospecting and to derive sucient benets from it and prospective
bioprospectors must be will to negotiate and act in good faith.
45